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NAJEEB SAMIE*

Extraterritorial Enforcement of
United States Antitrust Laws:
The British Reaction
An Introduction to the Problem
In a world of economic interdependence among countries, it is inevitable
that economic policy in one state will have economic effects in others. The
dilemma faced by the community of nations is that it is not possible for any
existing state in this widely diversified world to match its laws fully to the
dimensions of international trade.
Lately, other nations have called into question the wide substantive
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. ' To date a number of countries
have enacted defensive, retaliatory legislation to inhibit the United States'
reach. However, the British government's most recent action of enacting
the Protection of Trading Interests Act 2 (POTI Act) represents the strongest
action taken by a government to resist foreign pressures and foreign government policy "encroachment" in its territory.
The purpose of this note is to identify why the British were provoked into
enacting such an assertive legislation.
*Mr. Samie practices law in Washington, D.C.
'The U.S. antitrust statutes affecting foreign trade are Sherman Act, §§ I and 2 (15 U.S.C.
§§ I and 2 (1976)), Clayton Act, §§ 3, 7, and 12 (15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18, and 22 (1976)), Federal
Trade Commission Act, §§ 4 and 5 (15 U.S.C. §§ 44 and 45 (1976)), Wilson Tariff Act, §§ 73,
74, 75, and 76 (15 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 10, and 11 (1976)), Webb-Pomerene Act, §§ 1, 2, 3, and 4 (15
U.S.C. §§ 61, 62, 63, and 64 (1976)); the problem faced in the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws
is not a problem peculiar to antitrust, but similar types of problems are also related to illicit
payment, (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78dd-I, 78dd-2, 78ff
(1976)). There are some questions as to the Environmental Protection Act's extraterritorial
reach too, (Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 and Supp. III 1979)).
21980, c. 11; in force March 20, 1980; [Bill 66], Protection of Trading Interests Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on November 15, 1979, [hereinafter cited as Bill]; see Lowe,
Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction- The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
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Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

The question of extraterritorial jurisdiction covers a wide area. It covers
crime generally and such particular questions as labor laws, securities laws,
currency
laws, shipping contracts, production of documents, and a host of
3
others.
The many facets of international trade usually are controlled by national
legislation. However, the antitrust law has been the main focus of discus-

4
sion, particularly the extraterritorial enforcement of these laws.
The two major theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction at loggerheads in

the U.S. British conflict are those of "the effects doctrine" and "strict territoriality." The U.S. adherence to "effects doctrine" is one extreme, and the

U.K.'s "territoriality" is another.
The U.S. concept of legislative jurisdiction goes back to the doctrine of
"effects."' 5 According to the "effects doctrine," any act abroad which was
intended to and did affect U.S. interstate or foreign commerce is subject to
U.S. antitrust laws, irrespective of the nationality of the parties or the place
of occurrence.
At one time the United States supported the rule that a court in one state
could order an act to be done in another state, provided the act did not

violate the laws of the state in which it was to be performed. 6 But later on,
the same courts have assumed that they have authority to order or regulate
conduct abroad, regardless of the fact that such an order might violate for7
eign statutes.

The majority of nations, with a few exceptions, 8 take a much narrower
view and do not accept the "effects doctrine" as a basis for exercising juris-

diction in antitrust contexts. The nations opposing this doctrine argue that
such a doctrine was meant to deal only with conduct which is universally
recognized to be criminal in nature. Thus, nobody is troubled if courts
'Jennings, The ProperReach of TerritorialJurisdiction.-A Case Study of Divergent Attitudes,
2 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 35 (1972).
"'The Antitrust laws of the United States, of the European Communities, and of the Member States which have such laws, are all capable of some kind of extraterritorial applications."
COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 50

(Rahl ed. 1970).

'United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). ("Any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends . . . at least in
cases where the conduct was intended to affect imports and did affect them."); see also ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-

TIONS 6 (1977).
'RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 94 (1934); Onkelinx, Conflict of International
Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64
N.W. U. L. REV. 487, 502 (1969).
'See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 39
(1965): "(1) A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not precluded
from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in
conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with
respect to that conduct."
'See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 31 (1977).

Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
exercise wide extraterritorial jurisdiction in common crimes. An often
quoted example supporting such an attitude is where a person standing in
state A fires a shot that kills another person on the other side of the border
in state B. In this case state B, the country where the person was killed
(and thus, the effect was felt) would be considered to have subject matter
jurisdiction.
The outlook reflected in the above example leads most countries to contend that since the violation of U.S. antitrust laws 9 is not deemed to be a
universal crime, the U.S. courts therefore cannot assume subject matter
jurisdiction under the doctrine of "effects" when such effects are a result of
anticompetitive conduct. 1
Moreover, an assumption of jurisdiction over such conduct would be
regarded as an infringement on their sovereignty. The alleged infringement
is often viewed with indignation, as the one expressed by the House of
Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc."1 The British attitude toward the question of antitrust was officially stated in the case brought before the European Commission against a number of Dyestuff companies including Imperial Chemical
Industries (ICI).12 The British government took the somewhat unusual
stand of issuing to the European Commission an aide memoire in which it
stated that jurisdiction should not be exercised on the grounds of mere
effects.' 3 In addition, an extraterritorial enforcement in a particular case
or interests of other states.
sometimes conflicts with the specific policies
14
The Uranium Case is a classic example.
From the perspective of many nations, the assumption of jurisdiction
based on the economic effects may be viewed as an intrusion on their sovereignty, thereby justifying retaliation in the form of trade regulation legislation. Such an action may in turn result in the violation of the sovereignty of
the state where the alleged conduct occurred. It seems to be a whole chain
of events which in some way encroaches on the sovereignty of one state or
the other.
Era of Retaliatory Measures
In the past the United States was the only country with comprehensively
developed antitrust legislation.' 5 Recently there has been a remarkable
'See supra note 1.
"Griffin, American Antitrust Law andForeign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 137, 138

(1978).
"Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., All E.R. 434 (1977).
'"Commission's Decision of July 24, 1969. Ruling on Dyestuff Manufacturers, 12 O.J. BUR.
COMM. No. L195 (Aug. 1, 1969), [1965-1969] Transfer Binder (CCH) COMM. MKT. REP. 9314
(1969).
3
jennings supra note 3, at 38.
"4Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. IUl. 1978), consolidatedsub nom. In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 466 F. Supp. 958 (Jud. Pan. Mult.
Lit. 1978).
"Supra note 1.
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change in the number of countries having antitrust laws. This change has
occurred not only in the developed or industrial nations but also in developing or non-industrialized countries.16
The emergence of antitrust legislation in many countries is considered to
be a direct rebuttal to the United States' extraterritorial enforcement of its
antitrust laws. 17 Indeed, a primary function of these counter legislations is
to frustrate or resist foreign enforcement actions in their territories. A
number of states now have "blocking" legislations,18 which bar compliance
"See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 630, 903, and 926 (1965) (Appendix, Antitrust Development and Regulations of Foreign Countries). Some of these newer laws exercise wider coverage than that of the U.S. antitrust laws. For instance, the antitrust legislation of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) prohibits refusal to sell,
an offense not included in U.S. laws. (See OECD, REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ON REFUSAL TO SELL (1969)). The Scandinavian states
were among the first group of nations to adopt a public cartel register, and a similar feature is
now a part of many foreign antitrust laws. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 467 (2d ed. 1973). In West Germany section 98(2) of Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen reads:
This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition which have effect in the area in which
this
Act applies, even if they result from acts done outside such area.
'7One such example is the United Kingdom's POTI Act. Britain's new Protection of Trading
Interests Bill--target America; though it applies to all countries-. See infra note 27, at 66.
"Eg, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South
Africa, Switzerland, and West Germany. See Marks, State Department Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 153 (1978); "The Australians have taken a
far tougher line. This year they passed a law-and have used in the Uranium affair--empowering their government to declare unenforceable in Australia any foreign antitrust judgment
that it deems extraterritorial or even merely against Australia's national interest." Infra note
27, at 66. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 AUSTL.
ACTS P. No. 121, § 5; Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, Laws of
1964 c. 87 § 2 (United Kingdom) (The POTI Act seeks to repeal this law; see Bill's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 2, at i); Canada, various statutes preventing compliance with
subpoenas in uranium litigation. Atomic Energy Control Act, 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. C. A-19,
and Uranium Information Security Regulations, Stat. 0. & R. 76-644 (1976). See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (1977). Canadian Foreign Proceedings & Judgments Bill, Bill No. C41, July 11, 1980; The statutes of two Canadian
provinces also prohibit the production of any documents pursuant to the order of any other
jurisdiction. Business Records Protection Act, 1947, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 54 (1970); Business
Concerns Records Act 1964, QUE. REV. STAT. c. 278 records and data pursuant to a foreign
court order and compliance with foreign antitrust orders, decrees, and judgments has been
recommended by the REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY 408 (1968); In

some other nations, they have general laws prohibiting the removal or furnishing of certain
kinds of materials. See articles 89, 93, Law No. 17, Jan. 30, 1961, of the Republic of Panama,
prohibiting the removal of, or copying of documents for use in an action outside of Panama in
compliance with an order of an authority not of the Republic of Panama; quoted in application of The Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962); STGB, C.P., CODE. PEN.

articles 271, 273 1951 ROLF 12, 1938 ROLF 846, prohibiting certain acts for a foreign state,
and furnishing of secret economic information to a foreign official or firm; French Law Concerning Communication of Documents and Information of an Economic, Commercial, Industral, Financial or Technical Nature to Aliens. See Law Pertaining to the Disclosure of
Documents and Information of an Economic Commercial, Industrial, Financial, or Technical
Nature or Juristic Persons, July 16, 1980; The Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, art.
39, stb. 401, as amended by Act of July 16, 1958, stb. 413 (Netherlands); "New Zealand has just
joined Australia and the U.K. in passing legislation to restrict the flow of information to the

Enforcement of Antitrust Laws

317

with foreign directives requesting inspection of documents or evidence
located in their territory.' 9
British Government's Retaliatory Legislation against the
United States Antitrust Laws
In the process of retaliation against U.S. antitrust laws, the strongest act
to date comes from the United Kingdom. While the British have enacted a
number of substantive antitrust laws since 1948,20 the POTI Act is a purely
retaliatory act.
In Parliament, the British secretary of trade made two fundamental
points in support of the POTI Act. First, he emphasized the United Kingdom's strict adherence to the principle of territoriality as a basis of jurisdiction, arguing that the United States' "pernicious extraterritorial effects
doctrine has created uncertainty for international industry in this country
and elsewhere."' 2' Secondly, he viewed the imposition of treble damages.by
U.S. courts as penal rather than compensatory: treble damages are "by no
stretch 22of the imagination mere restitution or reparation to the injured
party."
United States on antitrust matters." Financial Times, Aug. 18, 1980, at 24, col. 5; South
Africa, Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30, 15 STAT. REP. So. AFR. 1045 (1977); Switzerland: Section 271 of the Swiss Penal Code apparently imposes criminal sanctions on any person who, without permission of the Swiss government, provides documents on behalf of a
foreign government; West Germany, Law of May 24, 1965, § 11 (1965) Burdesgesetzblatt
[BGBI] II 835; British Commonwealth, resolution by 41 British Commonwealth Nations
encouraging all members of the commonwealth to pass legislation curtailing extraterritorial
application of United States procedural and antitrust laws. [1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA), at A-10, May 8, 1980.
"See KALINOWSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS, section 94.09(1) (1977);
Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S Antitrust Litigation.- Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excusefor Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L
L. 747 (1974).
"0The monopolies and mergers in the United Kingdom are controlled by the Monopolies
and Restrictive Pratices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948 (11 and 23 Geo. 6, c. 66, reprinted
in 3 OECD GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, § 1.0 (United
Kingdom) (hereinafter cited as OECD Guide); MERGERS, CONSOLIDATION AND BIG BUSINESS

(The Dichley Foundation, 1970);

WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL AND ELLES, THE LAW OF
RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES (2d ed. 1966, with 1969 supplement)) and
the Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965 (3 OECD GUIDE, § 1.1). The Monopolies and

Restrictive Practices Commission Act of 1953 provided for the enlargement of the Commission. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 (4 and 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, 3 OECD GUIDE, § 1.2)
and that of 1968 (3 OECD GUIDE, § 1.5) are the statutes which deal with restrictive business
practices. The Fair Trading Act of 1973 created the office of Director General of Fair Trading
with the power to make reference to the commission. The other relevant legislation is the 1964
Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act (Shipping Contracts and Commercial
Documents Act, 1964) (the POTI Act seeks to repeal this Act). (Bill's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 2, at i.) This act was enacted primarily to thwart the Federal Maritime Commission's investigation of North Atlantic Conference activities which involved English vessels.
(Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964).
"See Hansard, November 15, 1979, 1533-1591.
"Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
146, 148 (1957).
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The factors which led the British government to enact the POTI Act trace
back to instances such as the famous Imperial Chemical Industries litigation. 23 The British court enjoined ICI to comply with the decree issued by
the U.S. court. 24 The vital element which served as a catalyst for the introduction of the POTI Act was the U.S. Justice Department's convening of a
grand jury to investigate the alleged international uranium cartel. 25 In
1977, the House of Lords rejected Westinghouse Electric's attempt to obtain
evidence relating to the alleged international uranium cartel. 26 Furthermore, the British were also alarmed by the actions filed by private American interests seeking damages from two mainly British consortia that had
taken part with several others in cartelized fare-fixing on the north
27
Atlantic.
In the presence of these conflicts, one observer remarked that "the British
government, like several others, is fed up with American attempts to extend
American antitrust law to things-like the uranium cartel, whose reality is
28
scarcely in question-done outside America by non-Americans.
Another writer believes that the present act exists because "the simmering
British frustration has come to a full boil."' 29 He is further of the opinion
that "the level of conflict" between the United States and the United Kingdom, "has continued to rise in recent years," and outlines the following
reasons for such a rise.
First the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have been increasingly active in
international business practices. Secondly, in accordance with its general policy,
the Justice Department has increasingly investigated in this field by use of the
grand jury ....
Thirdly, the United States has been willing to prosecute as antitrust violations private business conduct which a foreign government has-at
least privately-favored, encouraged or facilitated. Finally, expansion of British
companies into the United States during the past decade has produced some
highly visible merger suits (such as BP-Sohio) (1970 Trade Cases (CCH), 72988
(N.D. Ohio 1969)) and British Oxygen-AIRCO (557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977)) which

has been widely
criticized by the British press as discriminatory and
30
protectionist.
2
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) [hereinafter2cited as ICI].
4British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953], 2 All E. R. 780 (C.A.)
(injunction by lower court against compliance with U.S. decree affirmed; American decree was
"intrusion" on British sovereignty); British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
Ltd. [19551, 1 Ch. 19, [1952], Ch. 37, 1954, 3 All E. R. 88 (Ch.).
2
See generally UnitedNuclear Wins Judgment in Uranium Case, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1978, at
6; US. Charges Guf Oil in Uranium Price Fixing, Washington Post, May 10, 1978, at A2; see
also Kohlmeier, The Uranium Affair, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 149 (1978).
2
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978], 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977).
17THE ECONOMIST, November 3-9, 1979, at 64-66.
2
11d. at 66.
"9Baker, UK. Using New Weapons to Attack ForeignReach of U.S. Trust Laws, NAT'L L.J.,
January
14, 1980, at 24.
3
'1d. at col. 1-2.
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Extensive discussions between the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom took place, but of no great consequence. So
"[elnough's enough-this bloody nonsense has to stop," was the attitude of
the present government in the United Kingdom. 3' In September, 1979, the
British secretary of trade announced publicly that his government would
32
bring in legislation to make some of the U.S. judgments unenforceable,
and in November of the same year the government did introduce the POTI
bill in the Parliament which later became the POTI Act.
The POTI Act is intended to provide "protection for persons in the
United Kingdom from certain measures taken under the laws of overseas
countries when those measures apply to things done outside such countries. . . ,,33 The POTI Act empowers the trade secretary to take measures
to restrict the trade regulation efforts of another government covering
"things done or to be done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country
by persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or
threaten to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom. .... 34
The act under section 2 authorizes the secretary of trade to prohibit
export of documents in compliance with foreign directives to a court, tribunal or authority of an overseas country. The POTI Act also provides that a
British court shall refuse discovery requests, if it is shown that the request
"infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. ' '35 Section 3 is a penal
clause and provides penalties for failure to comply with the requirements
under sections 1 and 2.36 British courts under section 5 are enjoined from
entertaining any foreign multiple damage awards, 37 and also under section 4, when the secretary of state has given a certificate that the recovery
request, "infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise
-38 The trade
prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom ....
secretary's certificate is binding on the courts.
Finally, the unique provision of the POTI Act is section 6. This clause in
the act provides that British citizens, U.S. corporations, and other persons
carrying on business in the United Kingdom, who have been subject to
multiple damage judgment overseas, are entitled to recover, through the
39
British courts, from the party to whom the damages were awarded.

31

'd. at col. 2.
"Supra note 27, at 66.
33Bill's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 2, at i.
'POTI Act, supra note 2, at § l(l)(b).
3'1d. at § 2(2)(a).
36Id. at § 3.
17Id. at § 5.
31d. at § 4.
391d. at § 6.
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Conclusion
The real question focuses on whether it is possible to formulate any principles or procedures which will moderate and make reciprocally tolerable
these encroachments on state sovereignty. 40 The difficulty of concurrent
jurisdiction does not arise where there is a common interest in the exercise
of jurisdiction. Such a common interest, at any rate within limits, may be
created thrcugh bilateral or multilateral arrangements. Or, what is needed
41
is a moderate approach, such as the "jurisdictional rule of reason" suggested by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
If the present situation with regards to extraterritorial enforcement persists, it would appear that there will soon be a flood of "Protection of Trading Interests Acts," and not just confined to antitrust contexts but arising in
other areas too.

4'See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE,

(Tokyo
1964), comments by McDougal, 331.
4
'Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597,
614 (9th Cir. 1977).

